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Abstract
Artificial intelligence (AI) remains a crucial aspect for improving our modern lives but it
also casts several social and ethical issues. One issue is of major concern, investigated in
this research, is the amount of content users consume that is being generated by a form of
AI known as bots (automated software programs). With the rise of social bots and the
spread of fake news more research is required to understand how much content generated
by bots is being consumed. This research investigates the amount of bot generated content
relating to COVID-19. While research continues to uncover the extent to which our social
media platforms are being used as a terrain to spread information and misinformation, there
still remain issues when it comes to distinguishing between social bots and humans that
spread misinformation. Since online platforms have become a center for spreading fake
information that is often accelerated using bots this research examines the amount of bot
generated COVID-19 content on Twitter. A hybrid approach is presented to detect bots
using a Covid-19 dataset of 71,908 tweets collected between January 22nd, 2020 and April
2020, when the total reported cases of Covid-19 were below 600 globally.

Three

experiments were conducted using user account features, topic analysis, and sentiment
features to detect bots and misinformation relating to the Covid-19 pandemic. Using Weka
Machine Learning Tool, Experiment I investigates the optimal algorithms that can be used
to detect bots on Twitter. We used 10-fold cross validation to test for prediction accuracy
on two labelled datasets. Each dataset contains a different set (category 1 and category 2)
of four features. Results from Experiment I show that category 1 features (favorite count,
listed count, name length, and number of tweets) combined with random forest algorithm

produced the best prediction accuracy and performed better than features found in category
2 (follower count, following count, length of screen name and description length). The best
feature was listed count followed by favorite count. It was also observed that using category
2 features for the two labelled datasets produced the same prediction accuracy (100%)
when Tree based classifiers are used.
To further investigate the validity of the features used in the two labelled datasets, in
Experiment II, each labelled dataset from Experiment I was used as a training sample to
classify two different labelled datasets. Results show that Category 1 features generated a
94% prediction accuracy as compared to 60% accuracy generated by category 2 features
using the Random Forest algorithm. Experiment III applies the results from Experiment I
and II to classify 39,091 account that posted Coronavirus related content. Using the random
forest algorithm and features identified Experiment I and II, our classification framework
detected 5867 out of 39,091 (15%) account as bots and 33,224 (85%) accounts as humans.
Further analysis revealed that bot accounts generated 30% (1949/6446) of Coronavirus
misinformation compared to 70% of misinformation created by human accounts. Closer
examination showed that about 30% of misinformation created by humans were retweets
of bot content. In addition, results suggest that bot accounts were involved in posting
content on fewer topics compared to humans. Our results also show that bots generated
more negative sentiments as compared to humans on Covid-19 related issues.
Consequently, topic distribution and sentiment may further improve the ability to
distinguish between bot and human accounts.
Keywords: Social Bots, Human, Misinformation, information, Detection Technique, Hybrid
Approach, Social Networking Features, Sentiments Features
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
There has always been the need to study how Bots or network of Bots (Sybils) affects social
media and its impact on politics and national security. If you are an individual that searches
for daily news on social media, like most people do, then you may be exposed to many
types of fake and misleading content (Dunn et al., 2011). For example, hoaxes, rumors,
fabricated stories, conspiracy theories, and click-bait are all forms of misleading content
(Dunn et al., 2011). While malicious social bots often wage disinformation campaigns by
targeting political or economic content, the volume of such campaigns render manual
detection infeasible. Social media users are often unable to identify content created by
social bots. Scrolling through your favorite social media page, it may not be obvious if
you come across a bot account.
A malicious bot is a compromised computer under the direction of a human operator called
“Botmaster” (Feily et al., 2009). The term “Bot” is derived from the word “Robot”, and
just like Robots, bots are created to perform a specific function in an automated manner
(Feily et al., 2009). These bots are pieces of software programs that run on infected
machines without the user knowing about their existence (Al-Hammadi & Aickelin, 2017).
Botnets or Sybils (network of compromised computers) have become a huge cybersecurity
problem and have been used as a means to carry out most forms of cyber-attack (Eslahi et
al., 2012).
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The presence of these computerized agents has been observed in many sections of social
media applications such as Twitter which has been the most affected (Shao et al., 2018).
These social media bots create a platform for the spreading of several illegal activities
such as launching DDOS attacks against specific targets (Feily et al., 2009). A publication
on MIT Technology Review in 2020 reported that researchers observed that about half of
some 200 million tweets on the novel COVID-19 likely came from bots, with many of
them spreading false information, pushing conspiracy theories, and advocating for the
United States to loosen restrictions in order to reopen America (Nearly Half of Twitter
Accounts Pushing to Reopen America May Be Bots | MIT Technology Review, 2020).
Figure 1.1 shows a typical Botnet architecture.

Figure 1.1: Botnet Architecture (Adapted from Depositphotos)

Though hard to verify, researchers have also put forward claims about how fake news can
change how people think during a pandemic (Evanega et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2020). Yet
we have seen many forms of demonstration of real harm in 2020 caused by the spread of
2

misinformation on social media relating to COVID-19 (P. Wang et al., 2018). The
influence of fake news on Twitter during the 2016 US presidential elections is a crucial
example that shows why much attention and research is needed to deal with malicious
social media bots. Using a casual model , the authors used a dataset of about 171 million
tweets to identify 30 million tweets spreading either false information or extremely biased
news from about 2.2 million users (Bovet & Makse, 2019).
Another research study used a dataset with 3.6 million tweets and observed that about
23.6% of those tweets that were examined were spreading hate speech by dividing public
views on issues concerning Brexit or the Catalan referendum (Rosso, 2019). While
misleading content is not something new, many online information platforms do not have
adequate safeguards to control and the spread of misinformation. It is now easy to use
social media to influence public opinion due to the low cost of creating fake websites and
the existence of several software-controlled social media profiles or pages (Dunn et al.,
2011).
Internet users believe in social contracts (Dunn et al., 2011) and can be made to accept and
spread content produced in a certain way (P. Wang et al., 2018). Moreover, the
augmentation of misleading news through social bots overwhelms our fact-checking
capacity because of our definite attention, as well as our propensities to consider what
appears current and to believe information in a social environment. A well worked out
strategy is required to fight against the spread of misinformation online (Dunn et al., 2011).
People need education when it comes to the consumption of news on all internet platforms
by the use of algorithms to widen the exposure to varied views and if malicious social bots
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are the reason for the spread of misinformation, then there is the need to focus our attention
on coming up with techniques to detect these malicious bots.
Mary Papenfuss from the HuffPost reported that there has been ongoing research about
how social media bots are spreading misleading content about the novel Coronavirus
(COVID-19) pandemic in May 2020. Researchers are yet to come up with a conclusion
about the entities or organizations that may be primarily responsible for the bots. The
primary objectives of this study are therefore to find out if the spread of misinformation
during the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic era was done by activities of Bots using a
hybrid Bot Detection model.
False news, extensively disseminated over all internet platforms, can be considered as a
form of computational propaganda (Howard et al., 2017). Social media have provided a
platform for substantial volumes of fake, dramatic and other forms of junk news at delicate
moments in our social setting, though most platforms disclose little about how much of this
content there is or how it impacts those who use the platform (Howard et al., 2017).
The United States Department of Homeland Security reported in 2020 that the World
Economic Forum has identified the spread of disinformation as one of the top 10 threats to
society(COVID-19 Exploited by Malicious Cyber Actors | CISA, 2020). It has been
reported that bots can jeopardize online information platforms as well as our society
(Ferrara et al., 2016). Prior studies have done a sensational job trying to figure out the best
malicious Bot detection technique to help slow down the spread of fake news on all online
information platforms, however the bot strategies continue to evolve to evade detection.
Today, some social bots have been used to penetrate political discourse, control the stock
market and steal private information (Bovet & Makse, 2019). Prior to the 2020 United
4

States elections, social media sites especially Twitter was flooded with bots that could
evade most bot detection techniques. In a new study, researchers at University of Southern
California identified thousands of bot accounts on Twitter that were uploading information
related to Donald Trump, President Biden and their political campaigns. Many of these
automated accounts were spreading disinformation and far-right conspiracy theories such
as “pizzagate” and QAnon (Twitter Bots Poised to Spread Disinformation Before Election
- The New York Times, 2020). Although social media platforms such as Twitter and
Facebook have worked effortlessly to control the impact of malicious social bots on their
respective platforms, identifying these bots still remain a difficult task and warrant further
research. The detection of social bots and the motive behind the spread of certain sensitive
and malicious information continues to be a significant research endeavor (Ferrara et al.,
2016).

1.2 Organization of the study
This paper is organized into five (5) chapters. Chapter 1 which is the introductory chapter
includes the background and motivation of the study, organization of the study, literature
review and limitation of the study. The review of literature is an attempt to study prior
studies on social bots to help have a better understanding of the issue or the problem this
research seeks to solve. Chapter two includes the objectives of the study, problem statement
and hypothesis. Chapter 3 describes the methodology, the dataset used in this study as well
as the description of the experiments conducted. Chapter 4 focuses on analysis of the data,
experimental results, misinformation and topic analysis, entities responsible for the spread
of Covid-19 misinformation and sentiment analysis. Chapter five is the summary of the
research findings and recommendations for future research.
5

1.3 Literature Review
Today, the research computing community is still designing sophisticated methods that can
automatically detect or prevent malicious social bots that spread misinformation on online
platforms. Bot detection techniques can be broadly divided into three distinct groups: (1)
Graph-Based Social Bot Detection, (2) Crowdsourcing Social Bot Detection and (3)
Feature-Based Social Bot Detection (Ferrara et al., 2016).

1.3.1 Graph Based Social Bot Detection
Graph Based Social Bot Detection is an intuitive way of representing network
communications using graphs. A strategy developed known as BotChase presents a twophased graph-based bot detection system that controls both unsupervised and supervised
Machine Leaning. The authors application of BotChase could detect several types of bots
and showed toughness to zero-day attacks (Daya et al., 2020). The author also observed
that the BotChase strategy that they implemented was suitable for large-scale data and
different network topologies. The authors in (Chowdhury et al., 2017) also proposed a bot
detection technique based on topological characteristics of nodes within a graph. The
authors administered a self-organizing map clustering method that was applied to establish
clusters of nodes in the network based on these characteristics.
Previous research has also proposed a method that can isolate nodes in clusters of small
size while containing the majority of the normal node in the same big cluster (Daya et al.,
2020). Furthermore, a Graph- based malware activity detection was introduced by this
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technique which makes use of a sequence of DNS queries in order to achieve robustness
against evasion techniques (Lee & Lee, 2014).
While Graph-Based detection can be applied without knowledge of a specific language a
major challenge is the availability of information that captures the complete topology of
the network. The best bot detection technique that applies Graph- Based Social Bot
Detection uses a hybrid analysis of flow-based and Graph- based traffic behaviors (W.
Wang et al., 2020). The authors argued that only using graph-based analysis would result
in false negatives or false positives or can even be eluded by malicious bots (W. Wang et
al., 2020). To address the limitation with graph-based analysis they proposed another
model known as BotMark that uses a hybrid analysis of flow –based and graph-based
network traffic behaviors (W. Wang et al., 2020). The authors technique was able to
characterize the botnets actions thoroughly as compared to other techniques. (W. Wang et
al., 2020) report that one limitation with BotMark is that Botnets can use a legitimate server
as their C&C communication to avoid detection. Since this paper will not be investigating
network communication patterns between nodes, this study will not adopt this technique to
detect malicious Twitter accounts.
1.3.2 Crowdsourcing Social Bot Detection
Wang et.al (2020) looked at the possibility of bot detection by humans. The authors
recommended crowdsourcing of social bot detection to multitudes of workers. An online
Social Turing test platform was created to see if humans can easily detect bot through the
evaluation of conversational nuances like sarcasm or perspective language or to look at
developing patterns and irregularities. The abilities of individuals were tested using data
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obtained from Facebook and Renren which is an online Chinese social networking
platform. The authors observed that the detection accuracy of both “experts” and “turkers”
under various conditions vary tremendously in their effectiveness with experts consistently
producing near perfect results. Though a great technique, crowdsourcing bot detection
method has its drawbacks and might not be cost effective to help achieve the listed
objectives and answer the research questions that this paper seeks to address.
1.3.3 Feature-based Social Bot Detection
Feature-based Social Bot Detection focuses on behavioral patterns that can be easily
encoded in features and adopted with machine learning strategies to observe the patterns
of human-like and bot-like behaviors (Ferrara et al., 2016.). Feature-based Social Bots
Detection makes it easier to categorize accounts based on their detected behaviors (Ferrara
et al., 2016).
The first social bot detection interface for Twitter in 2014 was made public to educate
individuals on online information platforms about the presence of malicious bot activities
(Ferrara et al., 2016). The authors proposed a bot detection algorithm that uses predictive
features that detect a variety of malicious behaviors to deduce if information was created
by a bot or human. A collection of networks, linguistic and application-oriented variables
are used as likely features that associate certain characteristics to humans or bots (Ferrara
et al., 2016). The challenge with using Feature-based bot detection is finding ground truth
dataset that can be used as a training set to classify an unlabeled dataset. Another challenge
is that the characteristics of a bot is increasingly becoming more humanlike so relying on
only user account features may lead to incorrect classifications.
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Chapter 2 Objectives of the study
2.1 Overview
The main objective of this present study is to contribute to an understanding of how
social media bots spread misleading information on online information platforms and
to find out if the spread of misinformation during the Coronavirus (COVID-19)
pandemic era was done by activities of Bots or other individuals/organizations using
hybrid approach that incorporates sentiment features, national language processing and
social networking features to detect bots. The two main objectives for this research are
to:
1. Identify twitter features that provide high discrimination quality for detecting bots
2. Investigate the spread of misinformation by bots during the initial months of the
COVID-19 pandemic
Prior research indicates that the user metadata and user content provide the greatest
discrimination accuracy (Shin et al., 2012). However, details on the specific features
within each category are not reported. To optimize the performance of the classifier,
optimal features within each category will be identified. Also, there is a discrepancy in
prior research regarding the quality of network features. While user meta-data and user
content have shown to perform the best (Shin et al., 2012), other studies suggest network
features provided the highest accuracy for detecting content polluters (Dhital & Gonen,
2019). We aim to use a hybrid approach that incorporates user account features and
sentiment features to detect malicious bot in Twitter.
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3. To identify the source (bot or human account) responsible for spreading
misinformation during the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic era.

2.2 Problem Statement
Many studies have been conducted on social media bots to examine how to detect them
and how these bots spread misinformation in online information platforms. Prior research
reviewed techniques that can be used to fabricate misinformation by combining social bots
and fake news to spread misinformation in a social setting (Daya et al.,2019; Wang et. al
in 2018). (Eslahi et.al in 2012), studied the characteristics of the malicious activities of
Bots and Botnets and came up with various detection techniques as well the challenges that
accompanied those techniques. (Shao et al., 2018) studied how social bots spreads fake
news by analyzing 14 million messages that were spreading 400 thousand claims during
the 2016 US presidential elections. The study concluded that social bots played a key role
in the spread of fake news during that time. Another study used a dataset with 3.6 million
tweets with a casual model and observed that about 23.6% of those tweets that were
examined were spreading hate speech by dividing public views on issues concerning Brexit
or the Catalan referendum (Rosso, 2019).
(Ferrara et al., 2016) studied the rise of social bots and its impact on several online
information platforms. Every aspect of our society is impacted heavily by social media
today as it allows users to interconnect and exchange content freely (P. Wang et al., 2018).
(Shin et al., 2012) among others also used a technique known as EFFORT to efficiently
and effectively detect Bot Malware. (Shin et al., 2012) report that EFFORT can detect all
15 real world bots related to their study.
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Recently, as of August 2020, there has been ongoing research about how social media bots
are spreading misleading content about the novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. The
authors in (Varol et al., 2017; Rosso, 2019; Shao et al., 2018; Daya et al., 2019; Kudugunta
& Ferrara, 2018) among others have studied the impact of malicious social bots and ways
malicious social bots can be detected or prevented. However, researchers are yet to come
up with a conclusion about what interest/entity may be primarily responsible for the bots.
Although several techniques to detect malicious social bots have been created, there still
remain issues when it comes distinguishing between social bots and human bots that spread
misinformation. Since manual bot detection is infeasible, this study will develop a novel
automated method to identify bots. While many automated methods have been proposed
they have mainly been driven by features available in Twitter and apply single method
approaches based on application specific features (Wang et al., 2019; Shin et al., 2012;
Dhital & Gonen, 2019). To accomplish this task a hybrid approach that combines a variety
of factors to detect bots will be developed. Specifically, the proposed bot detection model
will incorporate user account features, topic analysis and sentiment analysis. It is also our
objective to test different user account features to see which feature or set of features
produces the best classification accuracy. (Varol et al., 2017) for example achieved the best
classification performance by using two user account features i.e., follower count and
friend count while (Wijeratne et al., 2017) observed that favorite count, tweet count and
friend count are top three features that produced the best classification accuracy in their
research. We aim to use, test and rank all Twitter user account features available in our
Covid-19 Twitter dataset to observe their prediction and classification accuracy. The
context for the study of misinformation is Coronavirus (COVID-19) data on social media.
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This research will develop a model to identify bots and provide insights for organizations
or entities who have interest in controlling these bots that have spread of misinformation
during the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic era.

2.3 Hybrid Approach
This research proposes a hybrid method that integrates Twitter user account features,
sentiments features and topic analysis, to detect malicious social bots. A hybrid approach
is a way of combining multiple approaches to improve detection accuracy (Ferrara et al.,
2016). Wang et. al in 2018 developed a practical system using a server-side clickstream
technique that showed effectiveness and high detection accuracy in detecting fake
identities. This present study will rely on a similar approach conducted in prior research
to detect bots by analyzing topical content (Morstatter et al., 2016). In a prior study it was
observed that the content posted by bots can be a solid indicator that can help detect them
(Morstatter et al., 2016). The authors used Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to attain
topic representation of each user. However, the issue with using content for bot detection
is that the nature of the text features is sparse and have high dimensionality (Morstatter et
al., 2016).
Based on the review of prior bot detection studies, while many bot detection methods have
been proposed, the feature-based detection appears to be most promising method and is
therefore the focus of this research. This research will investigate new features and features
that have been underexplored in previous studies. Many studies have examined bot
detection accuracy using specific Twitter user account features (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee,
2011). We aim to use, test and rank all Twitter user account features and analyze their
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prediction and classification accuracy compared to features from a previous study (Lee,
Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011). In this paper, we investigate the following three features: (1)
topic distribution, (2) listed count, and (3) favorite count. These three user account features
have been rarely used in prior research. Topic distribution on Twitter has to do with the
variety of sentiments expressed by users on any given issue. listed count is a curated group
of Twitter accounts, and favorite count is the number of accounts a Twitter user has
favorited.

13

Chapter 3 Methodology
This is an empirical based research that uses several datasets with three experiments to
detect bots and bot generated content. We start by generating a Twitter dataset associated
with the novel coronavirus COVID-19 in a three-month period between January 22, 2020
to April 23, 2020. The Twitter’s search API is used to hydrate tweets from multiple
countries in various languages that contained any word associated with COVID-19 (i.e.,
ncov19, corona, covid, covid-19, virus, coronavirus, ncov2019) that were used in (Lopez
et

al.,

2020).

In

order

to

stick

to

Twitter’s

[Terms

of

service]

(https://developer.twitter.com/en/developer-terms/agreement-and-policy), only the Tweet
IDs of the Tweets collected are made available for non-commercial research use only.
The only keyword used hydrate tweets for the month of January was “Coronavirus” as
there was less talk of the pandemic at that time. As news about the Coronavirus spread,
additional keywords were added to the search list.
Month

Keyword(s)

January

Coronavirus, virus

February

Coronavirus, virus ncov19,
ncov2019
March
coronavirus, virus, covid,
ncov19, ncov2019
April
coronavirus, virus, covid,
ncov19, ncov2019
Table 3.1: Shows the various months and the keyword used to hydrate the tweets.

The keywords, presented in Table 3.1, used for search tweets are: virus and coronavirus
since 22 January, ncov19 and ncov2019 since 26 February, Coronavirus, virus, ncov19,
ncov2019 since 7 March 2020 and all keywords were used to hydrate tweets for the month
of April. A total of 71,908 tweets were sampled out of 115,000 tweets across the four14

month period that this paper focused on. Since there was a disproportionate amount of data
collected in January compared to other months this data was excluded from the analysis.
Moreover, twitter API can provide tweets up to 7 days so we ensured that there was a lag
of 7 days in the dataset to make sure enough tweets were hydrated. It is worth noting that
our dataset does not capture every tweet on twitter related to the Covid-19 keywords used
for hydration due to Twitter’s limits on how much tweets can be hydrated every 15 minutes.
However, it is also worth noting that there were some inconsistencies in our data collection
process. For example, only tweets in English were hydrated from 22 January to 31 January,
2020, after this brief period we found an algorithm that could collect tweets in all
languages. Our data collection technique could also track other keywords unrelated to
Covid-19 which resulted in fewer tweets relating to Coronavirus in our dataset in the first
few weeks.

3.1 Datasets
Obtaining a social bot dataset can be cumbersome due to the challenge in obtaining
conclusive ground truth (Morstatter et al., 2016). Two labeled datasets are used for ground
truth and serve as the training datasets: social honeypot and RTbust. The trained datasets
are used to detect bots with three test datasets (1) Fame for sale, (2) BotWikiCelebrity, and
(3) COVID-19. The classes for the Fame for sale and BotWikiCelebrity datasets are known
and the trained datasets are used to evaluate classification accuracy against data where the
classes are known. The COVID-19 data is unlabeled. While several ways to detect bots
have been put forward, we use two approaches to label Twitter users as bots or humans:
(1) social account features and (2) sentiment features. To train and test our model, we
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selected five (5) datasets of verified human and bot account from Bot Repository
(https://botometer.osome.iu.edu/bot-repository/datasets.html). We use Weka machine
learning tool to test for prediction accuracy to help select the best labelled dataset that can
be used as a training set for classification in this paper. The nature of the datasets and how
we collected the five (5) datasets have been summarized below:
3.1.1Training Dataset
3.1.1.1 The Social Honeypot Dataset

We use the Social Honeypot dataset as a training set in this paper. We chose the social
honeypot dataset because of its high prediction accuracy i.e., 99%. (Lee, Eoff, and
Caverlee, 2011) created a honeypot that could attract content polluters in Twitter. (Lee,
Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011) generated and deployed 60 social honeypot accounts in Twitter
whose function was to act like Twitter users and report what accounts follow or otherwise
communicate with them. (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011) manipulated how frequent the
honeypot account post and the sort of content that these accounts post on Twitter. The
author’s manipulation system ran from December 30, 2009 to August 2, 2010 and a total
of 22,223 polluters and 19,276 legit users were detected from 5,643,297 tweets. (Lee, Eoff,
and Caverlee, 2011) created a wide variety of user account features that were a part of one
of four groups:
•

UD screen name length, description length, account age

•

UFN following count, follower count, the ratio of the number of following and the
number of followers, bidirectional friend’s percentage

•

UC statuses count per day
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•

UH following change rate

(Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011) tested 30 classification algorithms using Weka machine
learning toolkit on five user account features ( i.e., screen name length, description length,
followers count, following count, and statuses count) and found their results consistent with
accuracy ranging between 98% to 95%. (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011) used these five
categories of features as these features produced the highest accuracy results in their
experiment. Table 3.2 shows a breakdown of content polluters and legit users that was
detected by the manipulation model built by (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011).
Class

User Profiles

Tweets

Polluters

22,223

2,380,059

Legit Users

19,276

3,263,238

Table 3.2: Social Honeypot Dataset.

3.1.1.2 RTbust Dataset

We use the RTbust dataset as our second training set in this paper. With a prediction
accuracy of 100%, (Mazza et al., 2019) had access to all Twitter metadata fields for each
tweet, retweet and user in their dataset. To collect this dataset, the authors used Twitter
Premium Search API to build a complete dataset using the following query parameters:
lang: IT and is: retweet. The authors carried out a manual annotation of a small subset of
the dataset to see the extent to which their technique was capable of correctly spotting bots
and ended up with an almost balanced annotated dataset, comprising of 51% bots and 49%
human accounts. The authors dataset consists of Italian tweets shared in a 2-week period
specifically between 17 and 30 June, 2018. The authors dataset consisted of 9,989,819
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retweets, shared by 1,446,250 different users. (Mazza et al., 2019) observed that on an
average each user in their dataset retweeted about 7 times per day which was in line with
current statistics that reported daily retweets between 2 to 50 for legitimate users. (Mazza
et al., 2019) argue that although their dataset is mainly Italian, the analytical approach and
the data collection process is strictly language independent. We use all 14,640,084 tweets
from 1000 annotated accounts from the RTbust dataset in this paper.
3.2 Test Datasets
3.2.1 Fame for sale Dataset

The fame for sale: Efficient Detection of fake Twitter followers on twitter was used as a
testing dataset in this paper. (Cresci et al., 2015) set up a project to recruit Twitter users to
voluntarily join an academic study for discovering fake followers on Twitter. This initiative
was set up by (Cresci et al., 2015) to create a dataset of verified human accounts on Twitter.
(Cresci et al., 2015) launched a verification phase on the 574 human accounts and named
this initiative as the “the fake project” dataset. The #elezioni2013 (E13) was also created
by (Cresci et al., 2015) and it is made up of active Italian Twitter users, with different
professional profiles and belong to assorted social classes.
To create their bot dataset, (Cresci et al., 2015) purchased 3000 fake accounts in April,
2013 from different Twitter online markets. To be specific, the authors purchased 1000
fake accounts from http://fastfollowerz.com, 1000 from https://intertwitter.com and 1000
fake accounts from http://twittertechnology.com. To create our legitimate user dataset, we
sampled 235 out of 574 human accounts from “thefakeproject” (TFP) and 964 out of 1488
from the #elezioni2013(E13) verified human dataset. We created our bot dataset by

18

selecting all 1335 fake followers from the “intertwitter” (INT) dataset. Therefore, a total
of 1199 legitimate accounts and 1335 fake accounts were used for the test dataset. The
account details for the test dataset as well as the number of followers and friends are
provided in Table 3.3
Dataset

Accounts

Followers

Friends

TFP (@TheFakeProject

235

183,166

152,664

E13 (#elezioni2013)

964

797,432

420,450

INT (intertwitter)

1335

22,518

517,100

Human Dataset

1199

980,598

573114

Bot Dataset

1335

22,518

517,100

Testing Dataset

2534

1,003,116

1,090,214

Table 3.3: Shows statistics about total collected data for testing.

3.2.2 BotwikiCelebrity Dataset

The performance of the social honeypot dataset was not encouraging so we created the
BotwikiCelebrity dataset as another test dataset to see if the classification framework from
the social honeypot dataset can accurately distinguish between what is a human and what
is a bot. We performed a cross-dataset analysis by using uploaded bot dataset on Bot
Repository to create our final testing dataset. To create our final testing dataset, we merged
the Self-identified bots (botwiki-verified) dataset from (Yang et al., 2020) and Celebrity
account collected as authentic users (celebrity) dataset from (Onur et al., 2019) to create a
new testing dataset. One way to analyze different labeled dataset is to look at the datasets
in feature space (Yang et al., 2020). Visualizing the two datasets together was difficult as
there were too many data points so instead we sampled 500 out of 699 verified bots from
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the botwiki dataset and 500 out of 20,984 verified human accounts from the celebrity
dataset to create a balanced dataset.
3.2.3 COVID-19 Dataset

Using Twitter’s API, we hydrated tweets relating to Covid-19 from January to April to
build the Covid-19 dataset. To quantify text and make sure certain characters are not
counted, we removed characters such as (;, :, *. ‘’, ,|,\, {,[, spaces etc.) from the text
attribute. Using the user_attribute_string function we extracted the user attributes such as
user_id, description, friend count, follower count etc. from the user column to create a
total of 71,908 tweets out of 115,000 tweets that we collected from January to April.
Dataset

Number of bots

Number of humans

Data points

Account
Features

Social Honeypot

22,223

19,276

41,499

5

RTbust

190

209

399

8

Botwiki

698

0

698

8

Celebrity

0

5971

5971

8

Covid-19

Unlabeled

Unlabeled

71,908

8

Table 3.4: Shows the datasets used for our experiment.

3.3 Hypotheses
To achieve the stated objectives in section 2.1, the following four hypotheses are
investigated:
H1: The spread of misinformation or disinformation by bots regarding content related to
COVID-19 will be higher than the spread of misinformation or disinformation by humans.
While it is known that bots spread low quality information on Twitter. (Shao et al., 2018),
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we do not attempt to distinguish between misinformation and disinformation.

It is

therefore our objective to analyze the percentage of social media bots in our examined
Covid-19.
H2: The accuracy to detect misinformation by bots will be higher using twitter features
such as favorite count, listed count, and topic distribution as compared to social honeypot
features. In this paper, we propose three new features: (1) topic distribution, (2) listed count
and (3) favorite count.
These three user account features have been rarely used in prior research. Topic distribution
on Twitter has to do with the variety of sentiments expressed by users on any given issue.
Listed count is a curated group of Twitter accounts, and favorite count is the number of
accounts a Twitter user has favorited.
Most prior studies have relied on well-known Twitter user account features such as count,
friend count, Tweet count, name length, account age and description length. These features
are considered to be top features with the highest predictive power and few research studies
have investigated features such as listed count, favorite count, and screen name length as
they have a lower predictive power when it comes to distinguishing between a bot and a
human (Varol et al., 2017; A. H. Wang, 2010; Cresci et al., 2015; Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee,
2011). Favorite count, listed count and screen name length will be used in our training and
testing experiment to see how well they improve our classification algorithm.
H3: The distribution of different topics will be greater for humans compared to bots. We
expect humans to have a wider variety of topics expressed in Twitter as compared to bots.
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Our reasoning is that we think bots are much more likely to have a target or an agenda that
needs to be talked about to change the economic, political or social setting of an online
platform. Hashtags will be extracted from tweets text for all tweets hydrated between 1st
February, 2020 to 31st April 2020. Bot sentinel will be used to estimate hashtags with
emerging popularity to help us test our hypothesis 3.
H4: Detected bots will express more negative sentiments compared to humans.
The rationale behind this is that we believe bots are more likely to engage in creating
negative inflammatory content compared to humans (Stella, Ferrara, & De Domenico,
2018).

3.4 Experiments
We first aim to replicate the results found in (Cresci et al., 2015) and the merged
BotwikiCelebrity dataset by using the classification framework we build using the Social
Honeypot Dataset and the RTbust Dataset. Comparing the results obtained through the
experiment and the ones reported in (Cresci et al., 2015), (Yang et al., 2020) and (Onur et
al., 2019) will increase the level of confidence in the hybrid approach that this research will
rely on. To achieve this objective, this paper will test ten features (see Table 3.5) as seen
in (Cresci et al., 2015), (Yang et al., 2020) and (Onur et al., 2019).
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Twitter Attributes

Description

(1)

Name

Twitter defines “name” as the name of the user

Listed count

(2)

(3)

(4)

x

x

x

Curated group of Twitter accounts

x

x

x

Favorite count

The number of accounts a user has favorited

x

x

x

Statuses count

The number Tweets (including retweet) issued by a
specific user

x

x

x

Sentiment

Sentiments expressed on a given subject

x

x

x

x

User id

User features based on Twitter meta-data

x

x

x

x

Screen name

Handle or alias that a specific user identifies with

x

x

x

x

Follower count

The total number of Twitter users that follow a
specific user

x

x

x

x

Friends count

Total number of Twitter users that follow a specific
user

x

x

x

x

Description Length

Total character count of a description in a user profile

x

x

x

x

Table 3.5: Shows the features that will be used in this study. Features that are not seen in the Social Honeypot
dataset are shaded in grey. New feature proposed shaded in light blue. Features that are seen in all the
datasets used in this study are are not shaded. Datasets: (1) = Fame for sale, (2) = Social Honeypot, (3) = Selfidentified bots, (4) = RTbust

These ten features are highly predictive and capture several suspicious behaviors which
make it easier to differentiate between a bot and a human account using a bot detection
algorithm (Ferrara et al., 2016). If the results demonstrate potential, this study will
implement a new method to detect social bots by using a hybrid approach that incorporates
sentiment features
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and user account features. The new approach that this study seeks to implement will then
be tested on the COVID-19 dataset of millions of tweets between February, 2020 and April,
2020. We explain how we conducted our experiments in subsections 3.4.1 – 3.4.4.
3.4.1 Experiment I
We use the Social Honeypot Dataset and the RTbust dataset as our baseline dataset in our
first experiment. Using Weka machine learning tool (Witten et al., 2005), we followed the
same classification framework used by the authors in (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011) and
(Mazza et al., 2019) to see what the dataset’s prediction accuracy is. We tested 20
classification algorithms, such as random forest, naive Bayes, logistic regression and treebased algorithm, all with default values for all parameters using 10-fold cross validation.
10-fold cross validation is a way of dividing the original data into 10 equally-sized subsamples, and executing 10 training and validation procedures (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee,
2011).
3.4.2 Experiment II
In experiment II, we take the best training dataset from Experiment I to classify the Fame
for sale dataset. The social honeypot dataset or the RTbust dataset would be supplied as a
training set for the Fame for sale dataset. We test for accuracy by replacing the class labels
in the Fame for sale dataset with questions marks (?). Using Weka machine learning tool
(Witten et al., 2005), we try to replicate the results found in the Fame for sale dataset by
using our training datasets from experiment I. If the prediction results are not encouraging,
we aim to do a cross data analysis on Bot Repository to create a final testing dataset.
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3.4.3 Experiment III
Results from Experiment II will show which training dataset will be used for our unlabeled
Covid-19 dataset in Experiment III. We aim to classify the unlabeled Covid-19 dataset with
the best classification framework from Experiment II. An independent data analysis would
be done by randomly comparing 7000 detected tweets from bots and 14,000 detected
tweets from humans out of a total of 39,091 tweets to understand the sort of misinformation
or information that were being amplified between February and April. We intend to achieve
this by using an online sentiment tool known as Bot Sentinel. A fact checking tool known
as Poynter would also be used to check for misinformation in Experiment III.
3.4.4 Experimental Steps
Initially, the plan for this research was to study and collect data on Twitter users that were
actively posting Covid-19 tweets overtime but that was time consuming and very expensive
to achieve. We therefore rely on a dataset that we collected from January to April to test
the new approach that we propose for this paper. However, based on pilot studies we
conducted it was determined that tweet length and sentiment expressed over time was the
most accurate method for distinguishing a bot from a human. As a result, we relied on
daily tweet length plus all other user account features to improve the accuracy of our
results.
Additionally, there are other user account features such as location, verified, protected,
default profile image among others were discarded as there was little to no information to
collect for these features. To deliver accurate results, this study will try to duplicate the
results found in (Cresci et al., 2015); (Onur et al., 2019) and (Yang et al., 2020) by using
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behavioral patterns established in (Mazza et al., 2019) and (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011)
to see if the experiment can come up with the same results seen in (Cresci et al., 2015) and
(Yang et al., 2020).

Hydrate Tweets
using Twitter API

Run python code on the dataset to
extract and quantify text

Use labelled dataset as a test set
against the dataset collected

Convert. json
into .csv

Use Multiple
Classification Algorithm
to classify the dataset

Use labelled
dataset as a Test
set against
another labelled
dataset.

Figure 3.1: A graphic displaying our research plan.

Comparing the results obtained through the experiment and the ones reported in (Cresci et
al., 2015); (Onur et al., 2019) and (Yang et al., 2020) will increase the level of confidence
in the hybrid approach that this research will rely on. Figure 3.2 is a graphic display of the
steps that will be taken to achieve the goals of this paper.
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Chapter 4 Experimental Results
For the following experiments metadata associated with user accounts are used as the
features to detect bots. Tweets and tweet content is not used in the subsequent analyses.

4.1 Experiment I
For the Social Honeypot dataset, we found the results from Weka consistent, with a
prediction accuracy ranging from 100% to 87% across most classifiers (15 out 20 tested).
For the other 5 out of 20 tested, accuracy ranges between 84% to as low as 53%. Since the
Social Honeypot dataset has fewer features as compared to the RTbust dataset, we first
tested the same features seen in the social honeypot dataset for the RTbust dataset.
Prediction accuracy for the RTbust dataset ranges between 100% to 63% across most
classifiers (15 out 20 tested) and for the other 5 out of 20 tested, accuracy ranges between
63% to as low as 52%.
We observed that the strength of the classification lies primarily in the preference of
features used. Tree-based classifiers generated the best accuracy results. We also observed
an increase in prediction accuracy from 5% to 20% across most classifiers when all features
are used for the RTbust dataset. While it is clear that Tree-based classifiers produced the
best accuracy results, we observed that classification accuracy significantly drops after
Random Forest classifier in Table 4.1.
To understand why that is the case, we examined the nature of the social honeypot and the
RTbust dataset to come up with possible explanation as to why that happened. It is worth
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Classifier

Social Honeypot

RTbust

RTbust

(Same Features as Social

(all features)

Honeypot)
Random Tree

100%

100%

100%

Kstar

100%

100%

100%

IBk

100%

100%

100%

Random Forest

99.9%

100%

100%

REPTree

93.5%

82.2%

79.1%

J48

93%

81%

85.2%

LMT

92.5%

79%

81.7%

Decision Table

92.5%

69.6%

79.9%

JRip

92.7%

78.6%

82.9%

PART

92.4%

72.6%

82.2%

Multilayer Perception

91.7%

62.4%

81.9%

BayesNet

89.6%

69.6%

79,6%

SGD

89.4%

63.1%

75.9%

SimpleLogistic

87.1%

63.6%

76.1%

Logistic

87.1%

63.6%

75.6%

SMO

84.9%

59.6%

72.4%

OneR

81.1%

77.9%

81.4%

NaiveBayes

72.7%

52.6%

56.2%

NaiveBayesMultinominal

56.8%

58.1%

62.9%

ZeroR

53.5%

52.3%

52.3%

Average

88%

74%

80%

Table 4.1: shows the prediction accuracy of our two baseline datasets.

noting that some classifiers work well with smaller dataset while others do well with large
datasets. NaiveBayes, Logistic Regression, ZeroR etc. works well when the dataset is small
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as these classifiers has enough room to construct the decision boundary (Text Classification
with Extremely Small Datasets | by Anirudh Shenoy | Towards Data Science, 2019.).
On the other hand, Tree-based classifiers and Random Forest work well with large datasets
as they require little data preparation and can handle both numerical and categorical data
(7 Types of Classification Algorithms - Analytics India Magazine, 2020). (Kirubavathi
Venkatesh & Anitha Nadarajan, 2012), (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011), (Ji et al., 2016),
(Cresci et al., 2015), (Yang et al., 2020.), (Onur et al., 2019), (Davis et al., 2016) among
others have shown that Random Forest classifier is the best classifier when it comes
classifying a large Twitter dataset. For the purpose of this research, Random Forest has
been used to examine the results of this study.
To see which additional user account feature improved the prediction power for the RTbust
dataset, using Weka machine learning tool we compare the performance of the features that
are not used in the social honeypot dataset to the features used in the social honeypot
dataset. We grouped the user account into two categories with Category 1 being the features
used in the social honeypot dataset and Category 2 representing the features that are not
seen in the social honeypot dataset. We used Tree-based classifiers only to test and compare
these categories of features. The categories and the results are shown below:
Category 1: (nonsocial honeypot features): listed count, favorite count, length of name and
number of tweets
Category 2: (social honeypot features): follower count, following count, length of screen
name and description length
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Classifier

RTbust

Category 1

Category 2

(all features)

(social honeypot)

(not social honeypot)

Random Tree

100%

100%

100%

Random Forest

100%

100%

100%

J48

85.2%

81%

80%

LMT

81.7%

79%

81%

REPTree

79.1%

82%

83%

Average

89%

88%

89%

Table 4.1.1: Prediction accuracy using all features, Category 1 and Category 2 .

We observed that features found in Category 1 performed better than those found in
Category 2. In general, there was a 1% to 2% prediction accuracy increase across most
Tree-based classifiers that were used. Figure 4.1.1 also shows that the RTbust dataset
performs better when all user account features are used. Figure 4.1.1 and Figure 4.1.2
shows user account features from the RTbust and Social Honeypot dataset and their order
of importance. The x-axis shows the user account features and their respective values.
Figure 4.1.1 shows that listed count, favorite count, screen name length, name length and
description length improve the prediction accuracy of the RTbust classification framework
as compared to statuses count, following count and friend count. Figure 4.1.2 on the other
hand shows consistent performances from the features used for the social honeypot dataset.
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User Accoiunt Features

Friend Count
Following count
Statuses count

Description length
Name Length
Screen name length

Favourite count
Listed count
0
Listed count

Series1

0.9

0.1

Favourite
count
0.87

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

Screen name
Description
Name Length
length
length
0.83
0.79
0.79

0.6
Statuses
count
0.71

0.7

0.8
Following
count
0.67

0.9

1

Friend Count
0.65

Performance Value

Figure 4.1.1: Shows RTbust user account features and their performance values.

To understand why performance values are not consistent across the features used in the
RTbust dataset, we examined the nature of the RTbust dataset and noticed that there was
not much difference statistically when we compare the following count, friend count and
statuses count of bots to that of humans. There was however a major statistical difference
when we compare bots to humans using listed count, favorite count, screen name length
and name length. It is worth noting that Figure 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 shows the order of
importance of features for both dataset and does not necessarily mean that features with
low performance values are not good for making predictions. RTbust dataset for example
shows that prediction accuracy is high when all features are used compared to when few
are used.
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However, the social honeypot dataset performed poorly when used as a training dataset for
the fame for sale dataset because the dataset does not have 3 out of the top 4 performing
features which are better for classifying unlabeled data and this explains why the RTbust
dataset is the best for classifying the unlabeled Covid-19 dataset.

User Account Features

Description Length

Screen Name Length

Follower count

Following count

0.78
Series1

Following count
0.83

0.79

0.8

0.81

Follower count
0.84

0.82

0.83

0.84

Screen Name Length
0.86

0.85

0.86

0.87

Description Length
0.81

Performance Value

Figure 4.1.2: Shows Social Honeypot user account features and their performance values.
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4.2 Experiment II
In Experiment II, we first used each of our baseline datasets as a training set for our testing
dataset. The social honeypot dataset was supplied as a training set for the Fame for sale
dataset. The social honeypot dataset with a 99% prediction accuracy correctly classified
all accounts that were verified as bots in the Fame for sale: efficient detection of fake
Twitter follower’s dataset but misclassified 1284 human accounts as bots. The social
honeypot dataset could detect only 196 out of a total of 1199 verified human accounts as
humans. Table 4.3 shows that the social honeypot dataset performed poorly when used as
a training set for the Fame for sale dataset.
Using random forest classifier, the social honeypot dataset achieved a 47.6% precision and
51% accuracy. With so many incorrect classifications, we think the reason is due to the
fact that the social honeypot dataset is an old dataset which does not have other features
like name length, listed count, favorite count, reply count etc. that can be relied on to
improve detection accuracy. Additional factors that contributed to the poor results from
our first experiment will be discussed further below. The confusion matrix for the Social
Honeypot and RTbust data is presented in Table 4.2.1 and Table 4.2.2.
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Results

True Positive

True Negative

Predicted Positive
Predicted Negative

1335 (TP)
0 (FN)

1003 (FP)
196 (TN)

Measure

Value

Derivations

Sensitivity

1.0000

TPR = TP / (TP + FN)

Specificity

0.1635

SPC = TN / (FP + TN)

Precision

0.5710

PPV = TP / (TP + FP)

Negative Predictive Value

1.000

NPV = TN / (TN + FN)

False Positive Rate

0.8365

FPR = FP / (FP + TN)

False Discovery Rate

0.4290

FDR = FP / (FP + TP)

False Negative Rate

0.0000

FNR = FN / (FN + TP)

Accuracy

0.6042

ACC = (TP + TN) / (P + N)

F1 Score

0.7269

F1 = 2TP / (2TP + FP + FN)

0.3055

TP*TN - FP*FN
*(TN+FP)
*(TN+FN))

Matthews
Coefficient

Correlation

/

sqrt((TP+FP)

*(TP+FN)

Table 4.2.1: Confusion matrix for the result from our Social Honeypot testing dataset. The metrics used
were:screen_nameLength, description_length, following_count, friend_count,and statuses_count.
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Results

True Positive

True Negative

Predicted Positive
Predicted Negative
Measure

1308 (TP)
27 (FN)
Value

112 (FP)
1087 (TN)
Derivations

Sensitivity

0.9798

TPR = TP / (TP + FN)

Specificity

0.9066

SPC = TN / (FP + TN)

Precision

0.9211

PPV = TP / (TP + FP)

Negative Predictive Value

0.9758

NPV = TN / (TN + FN)

False Positive Rate

0.0934

FPR = FP / (FP + TN)

False Discovery Rate

0.0789

FDR = FP / (FP + TP)

False Negative Rate

0.0202

FNR = FN / (FN + TP)

Accuracy

0.9451

ACC = (TP + TN) / (P + N)

F1 Score

0.9495

F1 = 2TP / (2TP + FP + FN)

0.8916

TP*TN - FP*FN / sqrt((TP+FP)
*(TP+FN) *(TN+FP)
*(TN+FN))

Matthews
Coefficient

Correlation

Table 4.2.2: Confusion matrix for the results of our second testing dataset. Metrics used were: favorite count,
listed count, name length, and number of tweets.
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With precision and accuracy at 72% and 80% respectively, the RTbust dataset performed
better than the social honeypot dataset.
Dataset

Accuracy

F1

Social Honeypot

60%

0.73

RTbust

94%

0.95

Table 4.2.3: Comparison of accuracy and F1 for classifying Fame for Sale with the following features from
social honeypot: tLengthofName, tLengthofScreenName, tNumberofListedCount, tNumberoffavoriteCount
and tNumberofStatusesCount.

In our next RTbust classification experiment, we used the features that generated the best
predictive accuracy (i.e., listed count, favorite count, length of name, length of screen name
and statuses count) to see if the classification results would improve. The confusion matrix
for the classification framework is shown in Table 4.2.4. With precision and accuracy at
92% and 95% respectively, we decided to add more features to see if the accuracy of the
results improves. Since the strength of the classifier is dependent on the selective power of
the metric used (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011), in our next classification test, we randomly
added description length. Results are presented in Table 4.2.5.
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Results

True Positive

True Negative

Predicted Positive

968 (TP)

369 (FP)

Predicted Negative

168 (FN)

1308 (TN)

Measure

Value

Derivations

Sensitivity

0.8521

TPR = TP / (TP + FN)

Specificity

0.7800

SPC = TN / (FP + TN)

Precision

0.7240

PPV = TP / (TP + FP)

Negative Predictive Value

0.8862

NPV = TN / (TN + FN)

False Positive Rate

0.2200

FPR = FP / (FP + TN)

False Discovery Rate

0.2760

FDR = FP / (FP + TP)

False Negative Rate

0.1479

FNR = FN / (FN + TP)

Accuracy

0.8091

ACC = (TP + TN) / (P + N)

F1 Score

0.7829

F1 = 2TP / (2TP + FP + FN)

Matthews
Correlation 0.6210
TP*TN - FP*FN / sqrt((TP+FP)
Coefficient
*(TP+FN) *(TN+FP) *(TN+FN))
Table 4.2.2: Confusion matrix for the results of our RTbust testing dataset. Metrics used were: follower
count, following count, length of screen name and description length
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Results

True Positive

True Negative

Predicted Positive

1275 (TP)

356 (FP)

Predicted Negative

61 (FN)

841 (TN)

Measure

Value

Derivations

Sensitivity

0.9551

TPR = TP / (TP + FN)

Specificity

0.7026

SPC = TN / (FP + TN)

Precision

0.7817

PPV = TP / (TP + FP)

Negative Predictive Value

0.9334

NPV = TN / (TN + FN)

False Positive Rate

0.2183

FPR = FP / (FP + TN)

False Discovery Rate

0.0449

FDR = FP / (FP + TP)

False Negative Rate

0.0202

FNR = FN / (FN + TP)

Accuracy

0.8357

ACC = (TP + TN) / (P + N)

F1 Score

0.8597

F1 = 2TP / (2TP + FP + FN)

0.6858

TP*TN - FP*FN / sqrt((TP+FP)
*(TP+FN) *(TN+FP) *(TN+FN))

Matthews
Coefficient

Correlation

Table 4.2.4: Confusion matrix for the results of our second testing dataset. Metrics used were:
tLengthofName,
tLengthofScreenName,
tNumberofListedCount,
tLengthofdescription,
tNumberoffavoriteCount and tNumberofStatusesCount.

We observed that precision and accuracy dropped from 92% to 78.2% and 95% to 84%
respectively when description_length was introduced as a new feature. We decided to
randomly add more features to see how the results changes. To do this, we added follower
count, and following count to the set of features that we have already tested to observe the
changes in precision and recall. The confusion matrix for the classification framework is
presented in Table 4.2.6.
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Results

True Positive

True Negative

Predicted Positive

150 (TP)

134(FP)

Predicted Negative

1185 (FN)

990(TN)

Measure

Value

Derivations

Sensitivity

0.1124

TPR = TP / (TP + FN)

Specificity

0.8808

SPC = TN / (FP + TN)

Precision

0.5282

PPV = TP / (TP + FP)

0.4552

NPV = TN / (TN + FN)

False Positive Rate

0.1192

FPR = FP / (FP + TN)

False Discovery Rate

0.4718

FDR = FP / (FP + TP)

False Negative Rate

0.8876

FNR = FN / (FN + TP)

Accuracy

0.4636

ACC = (TP + TN) / (P + N)

F1 Score

0.1853

F1 = 2TP / (2TP + FP + FN)

-0.0107

TP*TN - FP*FN / sqrt((TP+FP)
*(TP+FN) *(TN+FP) *(TN+FN))

Negative
Value

Matthews
Coefficient

Predictive

Correlation

Table 4.2 5: Confusion matrix for the results of our second testing dataset. Metrics used were:
tLengthofName,
tLengthofScreenName,
tNumberofListedCount,
tNumberoffavorite,
tTheNumberofFollowers, tTheNumberofFollowing and tNumberofStatusesCount.

We observed that the more features added to the classification framework, the less accurate
our model becomes.
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4.3 Experiment III
Poor results obtained from the social honeypot experiment led us to creating a final testing
dataset. To understand why the social honeypot dataset performed poorly when it comes
to detecting human accounts, we performed a cross-dataset analysis by using uploaded bot
dataset on Bot Repository to create a new labeled dataset. We merged the Self-identified
bots (botwiki-verified) dataset and Celebrity account collected as authentic users
(celebrity) dataset to create a new testing dataset. One way to analyze different training
dataset is to look at the datasets in feature space (Yang et al., 2020).
Visualizing the two datasets together was difficult as there were too many data points so
instead we sampled 500 out of 699 verified bots from the botwiki dataset and 500 out of
20,984 verified human accounts from the celebrity dataset to create a balanced dataset. To
achieve consistency, we supplied the social honeypot dataset as a training set to test the
merged dataset. Using random forest classifier, the social honeypot dataset achieved a
58.9% precision and 65% accuracy (see Table 4.3.1) and this level of performance shows
that no dataset can generalize well on all other datasets (Yang et al., 2020).
We observed few factors that contributed to the poor results from the social honeypot
experiment. First, the datasets used had inconsistent classes. The social honeypot dataset
had few features as compared to the botwiki and celebrity dataset. The few features that
the social honeypot dataset has can only capture a tiny sector of a user account’s
characteristics. Third, the datasets used were annotated by different people with different
standards using variety of methods (Yang et al., 2020).
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Results
Predicted Positive
Predicted Negative

True Positive
500 (TP)
0 (FN)

Measure

Value

Derivations

Sensitivity

1.0000

TPR = TP / (TP + FN)

Specificity

0.3000

SPC = TN / (FP + TN)

Precision

0.5882

PPV = TP / (TP + FP)

Negative Predictive Value

1.0000

NPV = TN / (TN + FN)

False Positive Rate

0.7000

FPR = FP / (FP + TN)

False Discovery Rate

0.4118

FDR = FP / (FP + TP)

False Negative Rate

0.0000

FNR = FN / (FN + TP)

Accuracy

0.6500

ACC = (TP + TN) / (P + N)

F1 Score

0.7407

F1 = 2TP / (2TP + FP + FN)

0.4201

TP*TN - FP*FN / sqrt((TP+FP)
*(TP+FN) *(TN+FP) *(TN+FN))

Matthews
Coefficient

Correlation

True Negative
350 (FP)
150(TN)

Table 4.3.1: Confusion matrix for the results of our second testing dataset. Metrics used were:
tLengthofName,
tLengthofScreenName,
tNumberofListedCount,
tNumberoffavorite,
tTheNumberofFollowers, tTheNumberofFollowing and tNumberofStatusesCount.
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To contrast results with RTbust data to detect bots the social honeypot dataset was used to
classify the unlabeled COVID-19 data. We classified our COVID-19 dataset with the
classification framework from the social honeypot dataset to see how many bots the
classification algorithm detects in our COVID-19 dataset.

Figure 4.3.1: Covid-19 Trend analysis generated by using the social honeypot dataset as a training set. The
metrics used were userID, screen_namelength, description_length following_count, friend_count,
statuses_count.

Figure 4.3.1 shows that out of 39,091 tweets sampled from February to April, the model
we built using the social honeypot dataset classified 36,949 user accounts as bots and 2,142
user accounts as humans. We also generated a trend analysis Trend analysis by using
RTbust: Exploiting temporal patterns for botnet detection on twitter dataset to see how the
model we built classifies the COVID-19 dataset. Results are inverted compared to the
results obtained with the social honeypot data. Classifying the COVID-19 data with the
social honeypot shows more content was created by bots compared to humans while the
RTbust data suggests more human content was created compared to bots. This highlights
the impact of using the wrong training data. Consequently, based on the results obtained
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with RTbust from experiments I and II, it is our conjecture that RTbust provides a more

No of Tweets

accurate representation of bot generated content.
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12000
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0

February

March
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Bot

1295

1918

2654

Human

7713

10643

14868

Bot

Human

Figure 4.3.2: COVID-19 Trend analysis generated by the RTbust training set. The metrics used were userID,
namelength, screen_namelength, listed count, and favorites count.

We started by using the user account features (i.e., listed count, favorite count, length of
name, length of screen name and statuses count) that generated the highest precision and
accuracy (i.e., 92% and 95% respectively) from the training and testing dataset experiment.
Figure 4.3.2 shows that out of 39,091 tweets from February to April, the model we built
using the RTbust dataset detected 5,867 user accounts as bots as compared to 36,949 bots
detected by the model that we built using the social honeypot dataset. The RTbust
classification model also detected 33,224 accounts humans as compared to 2,142 detected
human accounts by the social honeypot classification framework
Based on the results in Table 4.3.2, it can be observed that there was a 43% increase in bot
generated content with the RTbust data compared to only a 39% increase in bot generated
content based on the social honeypot data. Even though the social honeypot data shows a
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Month

# bots

# bots

Social Honeypot

RTbust

(ACU < 0.5)

(ACU > 0.94)

February

8553

1295

March

11946

1918

April

16450

2654

39%

43%

Average % increase (Feb-April)

Table 4.3.2: Shows the monthly classification of bots from the model we built using our training datasets.

greater number of bots each month compared to humans the percentage increase is actually
lower. Also, we know that the social honeypot is not accurate but even still we can show
that the average increase in number of bots is greater.
The model we built using social honeypot dataset (ACU < 0.5) misclassified most user
accounts as bots while the RTbust model generated the results that we expected to see with
an accuracy at 95%. We observed that between February and March, the number of bots
detected increased by 32.4% from 1,295 to 1,918 and by 27.8% between the month of
March to April. Figure 4.3.2 also shows an upward trend of legitimate users that were
tweeting about the Coronavirus pandemic. A likely cause for this upward trend in human
generated content could be due to several factors such as, high unemployment rates across
all states, lockdowns and school shut downs. Twitter for example, has gained 14 million
additional users from the end of 2019 to the start of 2020 which is 24% higher than from
the end of 2018 to the start of 2019 (The Washington Post, 2020).
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We also observed a greater percentage increase in the number of bots detected with RTbust
training set (43%) as compared to Social Honeypot training set (39%) even though the
social honeypot shows a greater number of bots detected each month compared to humans,
the percentage increase is actually lower. Also, we know that the social honeypot is not
accurate but even still we can show that the average increase in the number of bots is
greater.

4.4 Misinformation and Topic Analysis
We performed an independent data analysis by randomly selecting 7000 detected tweets
for bots and 14,000 detected tweets for humans to see the sort of information or
misinformation that was been disseminated between January and April. Table 4.4.1 shows
the number of detected bots and humans that we randomly selected for topic analysis and
misinformation from our COVID-19 dataset.

Topic Analysis

Misinformation Analysis

Humans (N=1000)

Humans (N=14,000)

Bots (N=1000)

Bots (N=7000)

Table 4.4.1: shows the sample size for topic analysis and misinformation analysis

4.4.1 Bots
Bots were identified using the optimal features discussed in section 3 of this paper. Using
Bot Sentinel, we matched some of the most used hashtags from the user ids like
#coronavirus, #Covid-19, #Trump2020, #MAGA, #WWG1WGA, #TheGreatAwakening,
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and #DarkToLight. Bot Sentinel is a free platform created to spot and track trollbots and
malicious and untrustworthy Twitter accounts. Bot sentinel makes use of machine learning
and artificial intelligence to observe Twitter accounts and classify those accounts being
studied as social bots or not. Bot Sentinel stores these detected accounts in a database so
that developers can extract these accounts for further studies. Bot Sentinel also acts a
disinformation and misinformation tool by tracking, identifying and tagging malicious
accounts that may be spreading false information (Bot Sentinel , 2019).

Bot Topic Distribution
#TheGreatAwakenin
g
6%

#Others
9%

#MAGA
5%
#Trump2020
10%

#Coronavirus
56%

#Covid-19
14%

#Coronavirus

#Covid-19

#Trump2020

#MAGA

#TheGreatAwakening

#Others

Figure 4.4.1:Shows the most used hashtags by bots in our COVID-19 dataset from February 2020 – April
2020.

Figure 4.4.2 shows that out of the 1000 bots we selected, 56% of the bots that were detected
by our classification model were engaged in some form of conspiracies and political
propaganda when we looked at some of the tweets that were posted. 14% were engaged in
the discussion of the American public health. About 10% of the bots detected were engaged
in Trump and 5G conspiracies. The rest of the bots detected (#others) were engaged in the
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spread of other misinformation like “COVID is a hoax”, “bleach is a COVID cure”,
“wearing a mask increases your chances of getting COVID” etc. Online fact checking tools
like Poynter (http://www.poynter.com) and Bot Sentinel (Bot Sentinel, 2019) were used to
detect misinformation generated by bots. The spread of conspiracies on online social
media platforms is a well-established issue (E. Ferrara, 2020). It is worth noting that the
actual number of coronavirus related bot tweets are probably higher, as Bot Sentinel only
identifies hashtag terms (such as #Trump2020) and ignores “Trump2020” or “COVID-19”.
We also matched 1000 detected human tweets to see what sort of information or
misinformation that was been disseminated. COVID-19 has had a significant impact on the
quality of life in the US and around the world. During the months from February 2020 thru
April 2020 (period for our dataset), there were more than 60,000 deaths in the US,
unemployment level at 40 million, lockdowns and state of emergencies in all 50 states.
Consequently, as the pandemic became more widespread more online information was
being generated. Based on the analysis it can also be observed that there was an upward
trend of misinformation from the month of February to April in Figure 4.4.3.
To estimate the amount of misinformation during the months of February through April of
2020, tweets generated by humans is also analyzed.
4.4.2 Humans
Figure 4.4.3 shows that about 25% of detected human tweets were engaged in the
discussion

of

general

health

and

self-care

issues

(#CoronavirusIsTheTruth,

#TheGreatAwakening, #MAGA, #WWG1WGA, #quarantineandchill, #toiletpapercrisis,
#workfromhome, #Fauci), 22% were engaged in the discussion of the American public
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health, about 17% were engaged in the spread of conspiracies and political propaganda,
15% were engaged in WHO, Wuhan, vaccine and Trump issues, 11% were engaged in 5G
and Covid-19 conspiracies, and the rest of the human tweets detected were engaged in the
discussion of variety of topics (#others).

Human Topic Distribution
#Fauci
#workfromhome 6%
2%
#toiletpapercrisis
6%

#Others
4%

#Coronavirus (H)
33%

#quarantineandchill
4%
#WWG1WGA
3%
#MAGA
3%
#TheGreatAwakening
4%
#CoronavirusIsTheTruth
4%

#5G
5%
#Trump2020
8%

#Covid-19 (H)
18%

#Coronavirus (H)

#Covid-19 (H)

#Trump2020

#5G

#CoronavirusIsTheTruth

#TheGreatAwakening

#MAGA

#WWG1WGA

#quarantineandchill

#toiletpapercrisis

#workfromhome

#Fauci

#Others

Figure 4.4 2:Shows the most used hashtags by bots in our Covid-19 dataset.

Figure 4.4.3 also shows that humans were engaged in a wide variety of topics as compared
to bots. One notable distinction between bots and human tweets from Figures 4.4.2 and
Figure 4.4.3 is that bots tend to be more narrowly focused on a small number of hashtags
compared to humans.
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This suggests bots may apply a more targeted or localized approach for spreading
misinformation. In contrast the topic distribution for human tweets during the 3-month
period analyzed consists of greater diversity of topics. The difference in topic distribution
could be due the imbalance of data used for the analysis. Fewer tweets were analyzed for
bots compared to humans. To address this issue, our data was normalized in the following
analysis to more accurately measure the differences observed in topic distributions (see
Figure 4.4.2.1).
Bot Sentinel (Bot Sentinel, 2019) and Poynter (http://www.poynter.com) were used to
check for disinformation and misinformation that were disseminated by humans and bots
on Twitter between February and April. 14,000 tweets for humans and 7,000 tweets for
bots were randomly sampled from February 1, 2020 to April 30, 2020. A total of 21,000
tweets were used for misinformation analysis. We observed that #Coronavirus, and
#Covid-19 are the most used hashtags with the most misinformation. The #other category
is made up of other hashtags that were infrequently used by humans such as #Wuhan,
#Virus, #Fauci etc.
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Figure 4.4.3: Misinformation by humans over time (1000 tweets)

4.4.2.1 Reasons for misinformation disseminated by humans

Possible reasons for misinformation disseminated by humans are grouped into four
categories which have been explained below:
1. Ignorance
Ignorance was one crucial reason for the dissemination of wrong information in Twitter
between Feb 1st to Feb 12th, 2020. We observed that at that time Twitter users did not really
understand the nature of the pandemic, how the pandemic came about, how the
Coronavirus spreads, and what to do and what not to do. We observed a lot of
disinformation as compared misinformation between the first two weeks of February.
Wrong information ranged from the spread of conspiracies like “the virus is a man-made
weapon”, “Lysol can cure Coronavirus”, “the use of rubbing alcohol is enough to prevent
Coronavirus” etc. We also observed wrongful claims when it came to the number of people
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that had died from the virus or have been infected by the virus beginning February. For
example, we observed claims that more than 100,000 people have died from the virus
between February 1, 2020 to February 12, 2020. To solve the issue of disinformation and
misinformation, the WHO launched a pilot program (EPI-WIN) in early January that
extended to February to make sure that correct information are disseminated on various
social media platforms. This action by the WHO was laudable but did little to bring down
the issue of disinformation at that time. We observed that false information was retweeted
later on in the month of February.
2. Retweeting of Bot Tweets
About 30% of the misinformation or disinformation that we detected through Bot Sentinel
and Poynter came from retweets of Bot contents by humans. We observed that there were
political agendas behind these fake coronavirus tweets by Bot that were retweeted by
humans. For example, we observed that some Twitter users that oppose certain decisions
made by China tend to retweet anything that is politically against China to create
misunderstandings and make the people believe less in the Chinese authorities. Some of
the retweets that we observed were tweets that targeted the American health system and
leaders who are trying to manage the spread of the Coronavirus. We think that the purpose
of these tweets was to undermine, destroy or disrupt the American health system.
3. Illiteracy
Illiteracy was also one of the main reasons that led to the spread of misinformation and
disinformation among humans.in Twitter. For example, the WHO through its EPI – WIN
project had to exposed the falseness or hollowness of the belief that sesame oil and
breathing in the smoke can get rid of Coronavirus. We also observed that a lot of Americans
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did not clearly understand most of the messages that were relayed by Dr. Fauci and the
American Health System and this reflected in the tweets that the posted on their Twitter
homepages.
4. Conspiracies and political propaganda
Conspiracy theories and false information about Coronavirus became a problem, as the
pandemic spread across the globe. We detected a lot of tweets from February to April that
were making it cumbersome for online social media users to spot trustworthy sources of
information as these tweets were spreading conspiracies and political propaganda. The
growing number of people getting infected and the enforcement of social distancing
protocols led to widespread online discourse about the pandemic on various social media
outlets with an increasing number of conspiracies and misinformation (Sharma et al.,
2020). For example, Figure 4.4.5 shows some of the tweets that has been flagged as
spreading conspiracies from the tweets that we analyzed.

Figure 4.4 4: Shows examples of conspiracy tweets about 5G and Covid-19.
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4.4.2.2 Reasons for misinformation disseminated by humans
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Figure 4.4.5: Shows Bot Misinformation and Disinformation Trend Analysis (N=500)

Figure 4.4.6 shows the most used hashtags and the amount of disinformation that was
disseminated by bots from February 1st, 2020 to April 26th, 2020. At the time of this
writing (March 2021), most of the bots especially QAnon and Pro Trump bots detected by
our classification framework had already been taken down by Twitter so we relied mostly
on the dataset content that we hydrated using Twitter’s API to check for false information
by using Poynter’s FactChat. We observed a gradual rise in the level of misinformation
disseminated by Bots in Twitter. We categorize the entities responsible for the spread of
misinformation bots below:
1. Pro Trump Bots
We analyzed the bots detected by our classification framework and observed that in the
month of March, when the pandemic was becoming an issue in the United States and all
over the continent there were bots whose main agenda were to disseminate political
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conspiracies, and indorse the conspiracy theory that the Coronavirus was a virus or a
bioweapon created by China to destroy the United States. While analyzing tweet contents,
we found a lot of Pro Trump bot accounts that retweeted Covid-19 related issues in a
synchronized manner. We observed that, there were tweets from Pro Trump bots kept
posting virus conspiracy theories over a period of time. These tweets were retweeted, liked
many times by some Twitter users and had lots of impressions. At the time of this writing,
Twitter had already suspended over 5000 Pro Trump bot accounts and others that were
associated with it for amplifying certain political messages and spreading false
information. (Hunt, 2019). The outcome of this Pro Trump was the augmentation of
misinformation or disinformation by hardcore Trump supporters.
2. QAnon Bots
QAnon is a far right- wing, loosely organized association of supporters who accept a range
of unproven beliefs. The Storm and the Great Awakening are two major things that QAnon
followers are waiting for. The Storm has to do with the mass arrest of individuals in high
official positions while the Great Awakening has to do with a single event that would show
everyone that the QAnon beliefs were accurate the whole time (What Is QAnon? What We
Know About the Conspiracy-Theory Group – WSJ, 2021). During the pandemic, QAnon
followers added to their unproven belief that individuals that would take the Covid-19
vaccine increases the likelihood of them being classified as either homosexual or
transgender in the future. While most of the QAnon bots that our classification framework
detected were created by Researchers, we observed that most of the tweets by QAnon bots
were liked and retweeted by bots and supporters of QAnon. We also observed Russian
accounts that were backing these QAnon accounts.
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3. Republican Bots
Republican bots are bots that were trying to deceive social media users in the United States
and control the 2020 United States elections in favor of Donald Trump. While we did not
find any connections between republican bots that our model detected and Russian
operatives, (Chen et al., 2020) and (E. Ferrara, 2020) reported that these bots were created
and operated by Russians. According to these authors, Russian operatives created these
bots to make people support and vote for Donald Trump in the United States 2020 elections.
4. Human-Like Bots
In the past, Bots used to have simple tactics that were not difficult to spot but today,
artificial intelligence (AI) tools that creates human-like language have made it cumbersome
to detect certain malicious social media bots. This is due to the fact that, these human-like
bots behave in the same way as humans which makes it difficult to tell what is real and
what is not. Researchers have observed that these bots survive longer on social media
platforms and can create a network of bots which are synchronized to act in a certain
manner (E. Ferrara, 2020). Our detection model failed to detect any human- like bots but
we were able to detect botnets that were working together to disseminate false information
on Twitter using Bot Sentinel. Using Bot Sentinel, we examined user account features such
as follower count, account age, tweet sentiment score, friend count etc. to tell if tweets
from the account were coming from a human or a bot.
5. 5G Conspiracies
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5G Conspiracy theories picked up steam in 2020 when the Russian government’s news
outlet issued a warning that 5G can kill (Evanega et al., 2020). The “5G can kill” warning
was picked up by a French conspiracy website known as Les moutons enrages, which
proposed a direct relation between Covid-19 and the installation of 5G towers in Wuhan,
China. The unproven idea that there was a correlation between 5G and the novel
Coronavirus started to spread on Twitter and broke into mainstream media coverage on
April 5 with extensive reporting of destruction of 5G towers in the United Kingdom and
other countries(Evanega et al., 2020). 5G conspiracy tweets was one of the common
misinformation or disinformation tweets that we observed in our COVID-19 dataset. The
fact-checking feedback we got from Poynter and Bot Sentinel shows how misinformed or
disinformed individuals on Twitter have been during the early stages of the pandemic.

4.4.2.3 Bot Vs Human Misinformation Analysis

We focused on the most used hashtags for the detected bots and humans to see if bots have
a higher likelihood to spread misinformation as compared to humans. Figure 4.9.2 shows
that humans have a higher probability (0.24) to spread misinformation as compared to bots
(0.20) from our Covid-19 dataset. We mentioned earlier that we observed that about 30%
of tweets from detected humans that were spreading misinformation came from retweets
of bot content so that explains why we are seeing a higher likelihood to spread
misinformation by humans as compared to bots. When we account for humans retweeting
bot content, humans actually may not be spreading misinformation intentionally. Figure
4.4.7 shows that bots on Twitter indirectly spread misleading content through humans by
leveraging some human’s inability to detect false information.
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We also observed that after March 7th, 2020, there was a big separation between the
#Coronavirus and the # Covid-19 hashtags for humans. The big separation seen in Figure
4.4.8 for humans has to do with Twitter’s effort to crackdown Coronavirus related
misinformation between March and April. Twitter put in place policies aimed at
suspending tweets in all hashtags categories from user accounts that were disseminating
misinformation about the Coronavirus between March and April.

Figure 4.4.6: Shows the mean probability to spread misinformation (Bots vs Humans)

Since the #Coronavirus and #Covid-19 categories were the most used hashtags by bots and
humans, they were the most suspended as compared to the other categories.
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Figure 4.4.7: Shows the probability for misinformation (#Coronavirus, #Covid-19): bots vs humans.

4.3 Sentiment Analysis (Bots vs. Humans)
We analyze 100 tweets each for bots and humans detected in each of the #Coronovirus and
#Covid-19 category for every two weeks from February to April from our Covid-19 dataset
to see the sort of sentiments that were been expressed by the detected bots and humans As
a result, we sampled a total of 3,200 tweets from February to April. Sentiments were
extracted from the detected human and bot tweets to study their perception towards the
coronavirus outbreak. We use (Hutto & Gilbert, 2014.) lexical sentiment extraction to
generate the valence (positive or negative) of a Twitter user’s tweet. We also relied on Bot
Sentinel as an overall sentiment score generator to give every detected user account from
the two most used hashtags by bots and humans (#Coronavirus and #Covid-19) a sentiment
score and a sentiment rating.
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As discussed earlier, most of the prominent issues that were discussed on Twitter between
February and April centered around prevention measures such as the usage of hand
sanitizers and Lysol, frequent hand washing and the wearing of mask, travel restrictions,
global outbreaks (Italy, China, Germany, Iran etc.), symptoms and infections, global death
rates, government response etc. Figure 4.4.9 and Figure 4.4.10 shows the weekly average
sentiment score for detected humans and bots from the Covid-19 dataset.
From Figure 4.4.9 and Figure 4.4.10, we can see that the bots that our classification model
detected were expressing more negative sentiments as compared to humans. We also
observed that after 7th March, 2020 the level of negative sentiments expressed on the
pandemic dropped. As discussed earlier, the reason why we are seeing a dip in sentiments
expressed on Twitter with regards to the pandemic in the month of March has to do with
Twitter’s effort to crackdown misinformation when it comes to the pandemic.

uman entiment on #Coronavirus

uman entiment on #Covid 19

Figure 4.4.8: shows Human sentiment score on #Coronavirus and #Covid-19 (Left) and sample of tweets that
show how tweets are rated (Right).
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Bot entiment on #Covid 19

Bot entiment on #Coronavirus

Figure 4.4.9: Shows Bot sentiment score on #Coronavirus #Covid-19

Bot entiment #Coronavirus

uman entiment #Coronavirus

Figure 4.4 10: Shows the average sentiment (Bot vs Human) on #Coronavirus from February to March.
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Bot entiment #Covid 19

Figure 4.4 11: Shows the average sentiment (Bot vs Human) on #Covid-19 from February to March.

We also analyze the overall sentiment of a user’s account by evaluating his or her account
on Bot Sentinel for a general score. We use Bot Sentinel to rate the detected user accounts
in the #Coronavirus and #Covid-19 category with a score from 0-100. The higher the score,
the higher the likelihood that the account engages in the spread of false information and
other malicious activities such as harassment, trolling etc. Bot Sentinel analysis several
tweets per a Twitter account and the more a Twitter user engages in an act that is consistent
with disruptive or problematic accounts, the higher their Bot Sentinel score is. A total of
900 unique user accounts (450 detected bots and 450 detected human accounts) from
February to April were evaluated on Bot Sentinel for a general score. Figure 4.4.13 shows
how Bot entinel rates a user’s account based on his or her overall sentiments or tweets
posted on Twitter with regards to Covid-19 and any other issue.
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The purpose of rating and scoring the 900 unique Twitter accounts is to observe how many
detected bots and humans fall into the Normal, Satisfactory Disruptive and Problematic
categories on Bot Sentinel. Figure 4.4.14 shows that 189 out of the 450 bot accounts
detected by our classification framework were flagged as accounts exhibiting disruptive
behaviors. 89 and 158 detected bots exhibited Normal and Satisfactory Tweeting activities.
14 detected bot accounts produced no results which means that those accounts have been
suspended temporarily or permanently by Twitter.

Figure 4.4.12: Shows examples of how Bot Sentinel rates a Twitter user Account.

The results obtained from Bot Sentinel shows how difficult it is to tell if an account belongs
to a bot or human.
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Today, we have bots exhibiting human behaviors and normal tweeting activities on social
media platforms so the results obtained from Bot Sentinel is not surprising. Figure 4.4.14
also shows that out of the 450 selected human accounts that were evaluated on Bot Sentinel,
195 and 175 accounts exhibited Normal and Satisfactory tweeting activities. 63 out of the
450 human accounts were flagged as accounts exhibiting disruptive behaviors on Twitter.
17 detected human accounts were suspended temporarily or permanently which means that
there were more suspended human accounts as compared to bots. Bot Sentinel does not
show the specific reasons why those human and bot accounts were suspended. We believe
that those accounts were suspended due to violations of Twitter policies. None of the
accounts we evaluated on Bot Sentinel fell into the Problematic category.
250
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200
150
100
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Normal

Satisfactory

Disruptive

Suspended

Bot

89

158

189

14

Human
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175

63

17

Rating
Bot

Human

Figure 4.4.13: Shows Bot Sentinel rating and score for 900 unique Twitter accounts.
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Chapter 5 Conclusions
SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMENDATION
5.1 Introduction
We present the summary of major outcomes in chapter three and four in this chapter. Our
conclusions and recommendations which we draw from the outcomes of the research are examined
with respect to the objectives of the study which was to use a hybrid approach that incorporates
user account features, topic analysis and sentiment analysis to detect bots on a large-scale Twitter
dataset. We report the summary of key findings of this paper in Section 5.2. The concluding
remarks and recommendations of the research outcomes have been presented in Section 5.3 and
5.4 respectively.

5.2 Summary of Major Findings
We proposed a hybrid approach that integrates Twitter user account features, topic analysis
and sentiment analysis to detect malicious social bots. To achieve the objective of the
study, we used the newly developed Twitter COVID-19 endpoint to access COVID-19 and
coronavirus-related tweets across languages that provided a dataset of millions of tweets
between February 1st, 2020 to April 30th 2020.
The Twitter’s search API was used to hydrate tweets from multiple countries in various
languages that contained any word associated with COVID-19 (i.e., ncov19, covid, covid19, coronavirus, ncov2019) that were used in (Lopez et al., 2020). We sampled a total of
39,084 tweets out of 71,908 tweets across the three-month period that this paper focused
on. To differentiate a bot from a human, we adopted some of the features used by
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(Morstatter et al., 2016; Dickerson et al., 2014 Ferrara et al., 2016). As a result, we tested
eight (10) highly predictive user account features which captures several suspicious
behaviors to enable us to detect malicious social media bots. We relied on Bot Repository
to create a training and testing dataset of already labelled dataset for our experiment. For
our training dataset, we used the Social Honeypot Dataset as our first training dataset and
the RTbust: Exploiting Temporal Patterns for Botnet Detection on Twitter as our second
training dataset.
Using Weka machine learning tool, we followed the same classification framework used
by the authors in (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011) to see what the dataset’s prediction
accuracy is. In the first experiment, we tested 20 classification algorithms, such as, random
forest, naive Bayes, logistic regression and tree-based algorithm, all with default values for
all parameters using 10-fold cross validation. We found the results from Weka consistent,
with a prediction accuracy ranging from 99% to 91% across most classifiers (15 out 20
tested) for our first training dataset. For the other 5 out of 20 tested, accuracy ranged
between 90% to as low as 89%. We created our second training dataset by using 254 human
accounts and 144 bot accounts from the RTbust: Exploiting Temporal Patterns for Botnet
Detection on Twitter Dataset. We tested for prediction accuracy by using Random classifier
and observed a 100% prediction accuracy.
In the second experiment, we used the fame for sale: Efficient Detection of fake Twitter
followers on twitter as a testing dataset in this paper. To create our legitimate user dataset
from the fame for sale dataset, we sampled 235 out of 574 human accounts from
“thefakeproject” (TFP) and 964 out of 1488 from the #elezioni2013(E13) verified human
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dataset. We created our bot dataset by selecting all fake followers from the “intertwitter”
(INT) dataset.
We observed that the social honeypot dataset correctly classified all accounts that were
verified as bots in the Fame for sale: efficient detection of fake Twitter follower’s dataset
but misclassified 1284 human accounts as bots. The social honeypot dataset could detect
only 196 out of a total of 1199 verified human accounts as humans. Our second baseline
dataset was also used as a training set for Fame for sale: efficient detection of fake Twitter
follower dataset to see if the results are better than what the Social Honeypot dataset
produced. With precision and accuracy at 92% and 95% respectively, the results from our
second experiment with the same features used in the social honeypot dataset were better
than the results produced by the Social Honeypot training set. We observed that our
category 1 features (favorite count, listed count, name length, and number of tweets)
performed better than those found in category 2 (follower count, following count, length
of screen name and description length). In general, there was a 1% to 2% prediction
accuracy increase across most Tree-based classifiers that were used. However, we observed
that prediction accuracy of the RTbust classification framework dropped as we added
social honeypot features (see section 4).
In our third experiment, we created a final testing dataset due to poor results obtained from
our first testing dataset experiment. Using random forest classifier, the social honeypot
dataset achieved a 58.9% precision and 65% accuracy. We observed few factors that
contributed to the poor results from the social honeypot experiment. First, the datasets used
had inconsistent classes. The social honeypot dataset had few features as compared to the
botwiki and celebrity dataset. Second, the few features that the social honeypot dataset has
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can only capture a tiny sector of a user account’s characteristics. Lastly, the datasets used
were annotated by different people with different standards using variety of methods.
We classified our COVID-19 dataset by using the features that generated the highest
precision and accuracy (i.e., 92% and 95% respectively) from the training and testing
dataset experiment. Our classification framework shows that out of 39,091 tweets sampled,
the model we built using the RTbust dataset classified 5,867 user accounts as bots as
compared to 36,949 bots detected by the classification model built using the social
honeypot dataset.
To do a topic and trend analysis between bots and humans, we used Bot Sentinel to match
some of the hashtags from our Covid-19 tweet dataset like #coronavirus, #Covid-19,
#Trump2020, #MAGA, #WWG1WGA, #TheGreatAwakening, and #DarkToLight etc. We
observed that humans have a wide variety of topics expressed on Twitter as compared to
bots. We also observed that the sort of information disseminated by bots are much more
targeted as compared to humans. The most used hashtags for bots and humans from our
topic analysis were #Coronavirus and #Covid-19.
User

# of tweets for all hashtags

Fraction of Misinformation (human vs Bot) for all #hashtags

Human

14,000

4,497

Bot

7,000

1,949

Total

21,000

6,446

Table 5.2 1 Total number of detected human tweets used for sentiment analysis (#Coronavirus and #Covid19 only).

The dataset in Table 5.2.1 used for misinformation analysis contains twice as many tweets
posted by humans compared to bots. We used Bot Sentinel, Poynter and other fact
checking tools to check for misinformation among the detected bots and humans. 32% of
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human posts were classified as misinformation, while 30% of posts created by bots were
classified as misinformation.
Initial analysis suggested bots spread less misinformation compared to humans however,
it was observed that that about 30% of tweets from detected humans that were spreading
misinformation came from retweets of bot content. This result validates prior research
suggesting humans frequently re-tweet bot generated content (Shao, et al., 2018). This
may explain why we saw a higher likelihood to spread misinformation by humans as
compared to bots. When we account for humans retweeting bot content, humans actually
may not be spreading misinformation intentionally. We observed that bots on Twitter
indirectly spread misleading content through humans by leveraging some human’s inability
to detect false information. We categorize the entities responsible for the spread of
misinformation bots into: Pro Trump bots, QAnon bots, Republican bots, 5G conspiracies
and Human-like bots. We also categorize possible reasons for misinformation disseminated
by humans into: ignorance, illiteracy, retweeting of bot content and the spread of
conspiracies and political propaganda. We focused on the most used hashtags for the
detected bots and humans to see if bots have a higher likelihood to spread misinformation
as compared to humans.
Moreover, we analyze 100 tweets each for bots and humans detected in each of the
#Coronovirus and #Covid-19 category for every two weeks from February to April from
our Covid-19 dataset to see the sort of sentiments that were been expressed by the detected
bots and humans. As a result, a total of 3,200 tweets were used for sentiment analysis.
Details for the number of tweets used for sentiment analysis is provided in tables 5.2.25.2.4
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#Hashtag

Human

Bot

#Hashtag Total

#Coronavirus

800 tweets

800 tweets

1,600

#Covid-19

800 tweets

800 tweets

1,600

Total

1,600 tweets

1,600 tweets

3,200

Table 5.2 2 Total number of tweets used for sentiment analysis (#Coronavirus and #Covid-19 only)

#Hashtag

#Coronavirus

#Covid-19

#Hashtag Total

February

200

200

400

March

300

300

600

April

300

300

600

Monthly Total

800

800

1,600

Table 5.2 3 Total number of detected human tweets used for sentiment analysis (#Coronavirus and #Covid19 only).
#Hashtag

#Coronavirus

#Covid-19

#Hashtag Total

February

200

200

400

March

300

300

600

April

300

300

600

Monthly Total

800

800

1,600

Table 5.2 4 Total number of detected bots tweets used for sentiment analysis (#Coronavirus and #Covid-19
only).

It was observed that the bots that our classification model detected were expressing more
negative sentiments as compared to humans. We also we analyzed the overall sentiment
score of a Twitter user’s account by evaluating his or her account on Bot Sentinel. We
evaluated 900 unique Twitter accounts (450 each for bots and humans) in our Covid-19
dataset and observed that 189 out of the 450 bot accounts detected by our classification
framework were flagged as accounts exhibiting disruptive behaviors. 89 bot accounts were
flagged as accounts exhibiting Normal behaviors. 158 bot accounts exhibited Satisfactory
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Tweeting activities on Bot Sentinel. 14 detected bot accounts produced no results which
means that those accounts have been suspended temporarily or permanently by Twitter.
For humans, out of the 450 selected human accounts that were evaluated on Bot Sentinel,
195 detected human accounts exhibited Normal tweeting activities, 175 detected human
account were flagged as accounts exhibiting satisfactory tweeting activities. 63 out of the
450 human accounts were flagged as accounts exhibiting disruptive behaviors on Twitter.
17 detected human accounts were suspended temporarily or permanently which means that
there were more suspended human accounts as compared to bots. The sentiment results
obtained from Bot Sentinel are provided in Table 5.2.5 and Table 5.2.6.
Hashtag

Negative Sentiment

Positive Sentiment

N

#Coronavirus

27.6%

72.4%

800

#Covid-19

28.9%

72.4%

800

Table 5.2 5 Fraction of negative and positive sentiment generated by humans on #Coronavirus and #Covid19 from February to April

Hashtag

Negative Sentiment

Positive Sentiment

N

#Coronavirus

83.0%

29.5%

800

#Covid-19

83.6%

21.0%

800

Table 5.2 6 Fraction of negative and positive sentiment generated by bots on #Coronavirus and #Covid-19
from February to April

Comparing the results from both tables 5.2.4 and 5.2.5 it can be observed that bots
generated more posts of negative sentiment compared to humans and humans created more
posts with positive sentiment compared to bots. This result aligns with previous research
that suggest bot strategies are often focused on increasing human exposure to negative and
inflammatory narratives to exacerbating social conflict online (Stella, Ferrara, & De
Domenico, 2018).
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Today, we have bots exhibiting human behaviors and normal tweeting activities on social
media platforms and identifying features and methods to detect them is becoming
increasingly important. Results from this research provide insight into features and
algorithms that can help detect bots. Specifically, we found the random forest algorithm
provides the highest accuracy with twitter features such as favorite count and listed count
compared to results obtained in prior research.

In addition, sentiment and topic

distributions are other key factors that may help to discriminate between bot and human
social media behavior. Bots typically align with fewer topics compared to humans which
suggest bots have a narrower and targeted approach. Also, bots tend to create more
negative sentiment posts compared to human posts. A summary of the hypotheses and
results for this research are summarized in Table 5.2.7.
Hypothesis

Description

Result

H1

The spread of misinformation or disinformation by
bots regarding content related to COVID-19 will be
higher than the spread of misinformation or
disinformation by humans.

H2

The accuracy to detect misinformation by bots will be
higher using twitter features such as favorite count,
and listed count, as compared to social honeypot
features.

H3

The distribution of different topics will be greater for
humans compared to bots. We expect humans to have
a wider variety of topics expressed in Twitter as
compared to bots.

H4

Detected bots will express more negative sentiments
on Covid-19 related issues as compared to humans.

Supported:
Results from
Experiment III (section 4)
indicate bots spread more
disinformation compared to
humans
Supported:
Results
from
Experiment I shows that, favorite
count and listed count improves
the
accuracy
to
detect
mis/disinformation as compared
to social honeypot features
(section 5.2).
Supported: Results from section
4 shows that the topic distribution
for human tweets during the 3month period analyzed consists
of greater diversity of topics.
Supported: Results from section
4 shows that detected bots
expressed
more
negative
sentiments as compared to
humans on Covid-19 related
issues.

Table 5.2 7: Summary of results
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5.3 Concluding Remarks
This research explores social media bots, Botnets, detection of malicious bots, the motive
and entities behind the spread of misinformation by malicious bots during the Coronavirus
(COVID-19) pandemic era between February 1st, 2020 and April 30th, 2020. Using a hybrid
approach that incorporates Twitter user account features, topic analysis and sentiment
features to detect bots on a large-scale Twitter dataset, we were able to detect malicious
social media bots.
Our findings show that there were automated accounts that were used in a malicious
manner to spread misinformation and unhealthy propaganda campaigns about the COVID19 pandemic.

5.4 Recommendations
As of the time of writing this paper (mid-March, 2020), there was not enough studies that
researched into social media kinetics in the context of COVID-19. Today, a lot of studies
have observed the spread of misinformation and questionable content that relates to
COVID-19 pandemic, (Lopez et al., 2020 ; Chen et al., 2020; E. Ferrara, 2020; Evanega
et al., 2020 etc). Most of these studies have provided an incomplete outlook of online
discussion and problems revolving around COVID-19, (Chen et al., 2020). There is a need
for more research, as the landscape of information keeps evolving and more scientific
knowledge are unveiled on how the spread of misinformation corrupts the online eco
system, and also to help people understand what qualifies as a rumor, or misinformation.
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